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Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Montana Dept. of Envtl. Quality:
Stream Classification and Water Quality
Davis Connelley
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, March 13,
2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court,
Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building in Helena, Montana.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the following issues: 1) whether the
Montana Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) acted
unlawfully when it allowed a strip mine to renew its permit with far
lower pollution control requirements by recognizing receiving
waters as ephemeral streams; and 2) whether the monitoring
program MDEQ did require was too lenient and not representative
of the total discharges. This appeal presents an opportunity to clarify
MDEQ powers and has ramifications sounding in both agency
powers and potential environmental quality consequences for
Montana’s waters and mining industry.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Under the Clean Water Act, states are charged with
regulating pollution discharge into their waterways.1 The Montana
Water Quality Act (the Act) vitalized the state’s responsibility and
empowered the MDEQ to administer permits regulating those
discharges.2 Furthermore, the Act charged the Board of
Environmental Review (BER) with classifying the state’s
waterways, from A-1 to F-1, indicating most beneficial uses to least
beneficial uses.3 In 2012, Western Energy (WeCo), operators of the
25,000 acre Rosebud Mine, applied for a renewal of their discharge
permit for wastewater into East Armells Creek and its surrounding
waters, classified by the BER as C-3 waters. Mont. Admin. R.
17.30.629(1) requires that: “Waters classified C-3 are to be
maintained suitable for bathing, swimming, and recreation, and
growth and propagation of non-salmonid fishes and associated
aquatic life, waterfowl, and furbearers. The quality of these waters
is naturally marginal for drinking, culinary, and food processing
purposes, agriculture, and industrial water supply.”

1

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2018).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–5–102(1) (2017).
3
Id.
2
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MDEQ ultimately approved the permit and decided that
certain discharge standards did not need to be met, determining the
waters were ephemeral and therefore outside the purview of
otherwise applicable regulations.4 Ephemeral streams are those that
only flow in response to precipitation or snowmelt and whose entire
channel is above the water table.5 Because MDEQ made this
determination, the permit was exempted from many of the standards
applicable to otherwise C-3 designated waters.
In making this determination, MDEQ relied on the language
of Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.637(4): “Treatment requirements for
discharges to ephemeral streams must be no less than the minimum
treatment requirements set forth in ARM 17.30.1203. Ephemeral
streams are subject to ARM 17.30.635 through 17.30.637,
17.30.640, 17.30.641, 17.30.645, and 17.30.646 but not to the
specific water quality standards of ARM 17.30.620 through
17.30.629.” The permit also allowed for representative testing at
only a portion of the 151 outfalls at the discharge site. 6 MDEQ
approved this condition because of perceived difficulties accessing
every outfall during a large precipitation event during precipitationdriven discharges.7
After the modification and issuance of the renewed permit in
2014, plaintiff-appellees filed suit, alleging that the permit
essentially reclassified the waters from C-3 to E-1 and far exceeded
MDEQ’s authority.8 In 2016, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and invalidated the permit, ruling
that MDEQ arbitrarily overstepped its authorization both in
reclassifying the streams and in the representative monitoring
program the permit allowed.9 Appellants then filed this appeal on
both issues.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellants’ (MDEQ and WeCo) Arguments
Appellants argue that the district court applied an incorrect
standard when evaluating MDEQ’s decision and that the court
4

Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief at 2, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/L3X2-LLM5 (June 13, 2018)
(No. DA 18-0110).
5
Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.602(10).
6
Id. at 17.30.637(4).
7
Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
8
Id. at 7.
9
Id.
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wrongly decided the reclassification of waters was outside MDEQ’s
purview. Appellants also argue that the representative monitoring
program the department required was both within MDEQ’s
authority and supported by relevant data.
1. Stream Reclassification
MDEQ and WeCo contend that Mont. Admin. R.
17.30.637(4) vests MDEQ with authority to lessen treatment
requirements for streams it determines to be ephemeral and
therefore outside the scope of some of the permitting process
requirements. In fact, WeCo argues that MDEQ is not reclassifying
at all, but is instead simply recognizing the already ephemeral nature
of the waters at issue.10 They see a distinction between water types
and classifications.11 Instead of ephemeral referring solely to a
classification, they assert that ephemeral refers to a type of water
body independent of the classifications, which they allege are basinwide uses.12 Therefore, when MDEQ allowed the permit, it simply
took note of the waters’ existing characteristics rather than
reclassifying the streams.
They state that without allowing this discretion, the
permitting process will be over-cumbersome and strip MDEQ of the
ability to make reasonable determinations.13 They view MDEQ’s
mandate from the Board as flexible in order to account for individual
stream variations that may not be reflected through the basin-wide
classifications.14 They argue that by not adopting this view, the
district court has rendered Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.637(4)
superfluous and contrary to the principles of statutory
interpretation.15
2. Representative Outfall Monitoring

10

Id. at 11.
Appellant’s (WeCo) Opening Brief at 29, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr.
v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/W53M-5V57 (June 13,
2018) (No. DA 18-0110).
12
Id. at 29–30.
13
Appellant’s (MDEQ) Reply Brief at 13, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/C6RR-U8M6 (Jan. 11, 2019)
(No. DA 18-0110); Appellant’s (WeCO) Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 26 (if
decision is affirmed “permits (from all types of industry as well as from public
utilities) will be upended”).
14
Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief at 9, Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/6KCA-TT9Z (Jan. 11, 2019)
(No. DA 18-0110).
15
Id. at 14.
11
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Appellants assert that the representative program adopted in
the permit was fully within MDEQ’s discretion.16 So long as that
decision is not random and unreasonable, MDEQ can issue permits
with monitoring requirements that do not sample every single
outfall.17 They assert that the decision is not unreasonable and cite
as an example a similar Maryland monitoring program where such
monitoring was allowed so long as the sampled locations
represented the total discharge activity.18
They also argue that the program adopted was, in fact,
representative of the total outfalls.19 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j)(1)
provides that when monitoring the use of samples, those samples
“shall be representative of the monitored activity.”20 So long as the
samples are materially like the outfalls they represent, these samples
meet these requirements.21 Therefore, because the system adopted
has representative value, according to WeCo, MDEQ should be
afforded discretion, and the Court should allow the monitoring
program the permit adopted.22 Furthermore, WeCo argues that the
system actually prevents “arbitrary and capricious regulation of dry
gullies where no life occurs.”23
B. Appellees’ (MEIC) Argument
Appellees argue that the decision should be affirmed because
MDEQ’s decision to reclassify the receiving waters was not within
the Department’s authority, as the decision to reclassify lies with the
BER. Further, reclassification requires a use attainability analysis
(UAA) as part of the rule-making process. Appellees assert that the
process followed ignored the Department’s own studies and
included no analysis of the water’s actual character.24 Appellants
further argue that the Department’s monitoring program for the
permit was arbitrary and without any information or analysis
regarding the monitoring program.25

16

Appellant’s (MDEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 22.
Id. at 22.
18
Id. (citing Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t v. Riverkeeper, 134 A.3d 892
(Md. 2016)).
19
Id. at 22.
20
Appellant’s (WeCo) Opening Brief, supra note 11, at 42.
21
Id. at 43.
22
Id. at 44.
23
Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 9.
24
Appellees’ Combined Response Brief at 31–32, Montana Envtl. Info.
Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/KHN4-V8CY (Sept. 11,
2018) (No. DA 18-0110).
25
Id. at 32.
17
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1. Stream Reclassification
Appellees primarily rely upon Mont. Admin. R.
17.30.615(2), which states that the BER has the sole authority to
classify streams and change water quality standards.26 Specifically,
the BER must conduct a UAA, even when changing a stream’s
designation to ephemeral.27 Because MDEQ’s decision functionally
reclassifies the receiving waters, it impedes upon the BER process
and the public’s right to notice and comment.28 Because MDEQ
ignored these limitations on its authority, Appellees argue that it
failed to take the “hard look” required and did not consider and
reasonably analyze relevant data.29
Likewise, Appellees argue that MDEQ is not entitled to
deference because the rule at issue was promulgated by the EPA and
BER, and not the Department. Appellees view the rule at issue as
BER’s, rather than MDEQ’s.30 Because it is not MDEQ’s rule the
Department is interpreting, MDEQ cannot determine how it should
be applied and must follow BER’s interpretation and the purpose of
the rule.31
Appellees also contend that, even if it is MDEQ’s rule to
interpret, according to Clark Fork I32 the Department deserves no
deference where its interpretation of law is incorrect. 33 They argue
that MDEQ is incorrectly interpreting Mont. Admin. R.
17.30.637(4) in a way that is contrary to both the purposes of the
BER process and the Clean Water Act as a whole.34 Because
MDEQ’s interpretation defeats the broader statutory purpose, it
cannot be interpreted that way.35The change effectively exempts
pollution requirements and if those waters are not in fact ephemeral,
then pollutants are flowing unrestricted into Montana’s
headwaters.36
2. Representative Outfall Monitoring

26

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9 (citing Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.615 (1)–(2)).
28
Id. at 10.
29
Id. at 29 (citing Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008)) [hereinafter Clark Fork I].
30
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 30.
31
Id. at 39.
32
197 P.3d at 482.
33
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 39.
34
Id. at 38, 40.
35
Id. at 30.
36
Id. at 40.
27
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Appellees argue that the monitoring program allowed under
the permit whereby 20 of 151 outfalls will be examined is outside
MDEQ’s scope and contrary to MDEQ’s own data. They assert the
program is outside MDEQ’s scope because the representative
scheme is not allowed by governing regulations.37 They also assert
that representative monitoring programs have only been authorized
where the discharger was a large municipal water system, rather
than a private actor, such as is the case here.38
Appellees argue that the representative monitoring, even if
allowed, was selected in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner
because the 20 outfalls were not chosen in a manner supported with
data.39 Appellees claim that none of the selected outfalls are
representative on any level other than ease of access. 40 They also
claim that none of the selected outfalls are in areas where active
mining is occurring (and where risk of pollution is highest), but are
only in reclamation areas where active mining has ceased and
therefore results at those outfalls will not be demonstrative.41
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court will likely affirm the district court’s decision. On
the stream reclassification issue, the relatively small weight Mont.
Admin. R. 17.30.637(4) carries cannot overcome the weight
afforded to the BER’s UAA process, particularly in light of
MDEQ’s decision not to analyze the water’s actual nature. Even if
the Court overturns the decision on reclassification, it is unlikely the
Court would do the same with representative monitoring. While
representative monitoring could be allowed, the program adopted by
MDEQ in this instance lacks analytic support.
In this instance, data seems to support the contention that at
least some of the waters were not ephemeral.42 It is hard to imagine
that the permitting decision survives that error. Even if the
department has the authority to recognize the ephemeral nature of
specific waters, that authority does not apply to situations where the
waters at issue do not meet the definition of such waters under Mont.
Admin. R. 17.30.602(10), as at least some of the waters surrounding

37

Id. at 40.
Id. at 45–46.
39
Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 24, at 47–48.
40
Id. at 25.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 21.
38
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East Armells Creek do not meet the definition of ephemeral.43 It
would be a smoother process if MDEQ could simply claim that the
permitting action did not reclassify because they exempted the
waters from C-3 standards, rather than newly designating them as
E-1 or E-2.44 But this approach ignores the process already afforded
by law and would render at least some part of the classification
system pointless, and meets the “clear error in judgment” standard
required.45
Additionally, even if the Court does find that MDEQ was
within its powers to re-recognize the waters, it will likely affirm
summary judgment on the outfall issue. The law likely supports
MDEQ’s authority to authorize representative monitoring as it sees
fit and rightly deserves deference on its representing monitoring
decisions because those decisions are within the agency mandate as
contemplated in Clark Fork I. However, this deference does not
extend to situations where the program adopted is not supported by
analysis or a representative standard.46 Such a program would be
arbitrary by definition and therefore would be disallowed.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court will likely affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, invalidating the permit entirely due to either the
reclassification or on the narrower issue of non-representative
sampling. The Court’s decision will impact water quality and the
permitting process no matter what it decides. Allowing MDEQ such
wide discretion would streamline regulatory matters for both the
Department and the permittees but could have negative effects on
downstream water quality.47 Limiting MDEQ’s authority slows the
process, restricts flexibility for changed conditions, and places more
of a burden on the BER, but ensures the greatest amount of public
participation and compliance with the Clean Water Act.48 However,
the procedural and analytical irregularities relating to the actual

43
Id.; but see Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 10
(disagreeing with the contention that any of the waters are more than
ephemeral).
44
Appellant’s (WeCo) Reply Brief, supra note 14, at 11–12.
45
Clark Fork Coal. v. Dept. of Envtl. Qual., 288 P.3d 183, 190 (Mont.
2012) [hereinafter Clark Fork II].
46
Id. at 189–90.
47
See Clark Fork Coalition’s Amicus Brief at 3–4, Montana Envtl.
Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/9NGC-A3A2 (Sept.
12, 2018) (No. DA 18-0110).
48
See Treasure State Resources’ Amicus Brief at 2–5, Montana Envtl.
Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/2MY3-4PMR (June
13, 2018) (No. DA 18-0110).
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condition of the “ephemeral” waters and the representative outfalls
make this a challenging test case for those broader issues.

